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Introduction 
This paper discusses the historical conditions which prevented the 
emergence of a strong capitalist ruling class along the Kenyan lines in 
Tanzania. In Kenya, a nascent big bourgeoisie controlled African political 
associations as early as the 1930s, while in Tanzania, teachers, traders, and 
clerks were the mainstay of the independence movement, with kulak farmers 
participating (Awiti, 1972; Bienen, 1969; Hyden, 1968; Maguire, 1969), but 
never predominating as a class "to the extent where they could become an 
important political force at the national level" (Shivji, 1976: 50). A 
productive class of capitalists thereby came to engineer the state in 
independent Kenya, while in Tanzania the dominant force rested with an 
unproductive "bureaucratic bourgeoisie," a class awkwardly termed and poorly 
understood. The result in the case of Kenya was a capitalism which matured 
along rather classic lines, that is by increasing the productivity of labor 
without resulting in absolute immiseration,l whereas in Tanzania, capitalism 
was retarded along the lines suggested by the Narodniks2 with the 
predictable consequences of absolute pauperization described by Lenin. 
The paper is also the beginning of a larger effort to understand the 
material basis of Tanzania's ruling class and why it acted to stymie the 
development of capitalism after independence. "Nizers," "bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie" and the numerous terms devised to characterize this class are 
replete with political implications, but they do not answer this important 
question. The terms themselves are elusive, imprecise, and are often not 
substantiated by hard evidence. Moving behind the terms, one is still faced 
with an enigma: a class which appears faceless, whose actions are often 
interpreted somewhat ahistorically, and whose dialectic remains elusive at 
be,$t. These important gaps in our understanding cannot be surmounted and this 
cl~ss cannot be discussed empirically until more research is done. At 
piesent, it is impossible to say whether Tanzania's ruling class should be 
seen as a class of enrichers in Fanon's sense, whether it is instead a class 
attempting to transform itself into a proper capitalist class by using the 
state as its principal vehicle of accumulation, or whether it is something 
else altogether. What can be done in lieu of further research, and what this 
paper attempts to do, is to synthesize the existing secondary material and to 
begin to analyze the historical origins of the Tanzanian state and its 
populist bureaucratic class. 
While historical, this discussion of origins has certain theoretical 
implications concerning the development of capitalism. It departs from both 
bourgeois development literature and "dependencia" theorizing in the sense 
that it does not view third world states as neutral filters for international 
capital either in an inherently positive or in an inherently negative sense. 
It suggests instead that the class character of the state is critical in 
explaining the emergence of different types of capitalist systems. Along with 
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Kay (Kay, 1975) and Warren (Warren, 1973), it argues that capitalism has not 
matured uniformly and where it has created underdevelopment it is because it 
was never fully institutionalized and was therefore unable to transform the 
productivity of labor and hence the value of labor power itself (Kay, 1975: 
55). Beyond this, the paper maintains that individual colonial states adopted 
different policies towards the development of capitalism and it is these 
earlier developments which set the stage for later disparities. In the case 
of Kenya and Tanzania, it is clear that the class character of both indepen-
dent states mirror their colonial predecessors in terms of policies and 
attitudes towards the development of capitalism. In contrast to Kenya, 
colonial policies in Tanzania acted to retard capitalist development by 
discouraging primitive accumulation, promoting smallholder agriculture, and by 
embarking on a series of decisions which made the emergence of an industrial 
capitalist state after independence unlikely at best. 
The first part of the paper examines the historical antecedents of 
Tanzania's ruling class up to 1967, when Nyerere announced Tanzania's 
intention of pursuing a "socialist" alternative in the now famous Arusha 
Declaration.4 Much of this section is devoted to a discussion of policies 
adopted by the colonial state before independence in 1961 and the inherent 
contradiction of these policies from the standpoint of capitalist develop-
ment. It analyzes the colonial economy sector by sector and therefore departs 
from a strictly chronological history. The second part of the paper discusses 
the independence movement and the class content of the postcolonial state. It 
attempts to determine why Tanzania's ruling class acted to stifle the develop-
ment of capitalism and why such a course may not have been inimical to its 
material interests. Given the absence of strong evidence, the conclusions 
reached in this section are necessarily more tentative. 
Historical Antecents 
Tanganyika's status as an international mandate and Britain's weakened 
position after World War I were critical historically. Jointly they deter-
mined a series of policies which retarded capitalist development for most of 
the colonial period. 
Until the end of the war, Tanganyika was a German colony. She was then 
transferred to Great Britain, first as a mandate5 under the League of 
Nations and later as a trusteeship under the United Nations. Economic 
dislocation was the immediate impact of the transfer from Germany. Britain's 
first priority was to reestablish political order in the colony. Initially, 
the colonial state was forced to deal with a whole range of matters, from the 
transfer of German property, to revamping the colonial administrative 
apparatus, to normalizing relations with Germany--a task which was not 
completed until 1925 (Iliffe, 1979: 303). Consequently, economic concerns 
were postponed. A rather immediate indication of the economic disruption 
created by this change in imperial authority and the inevitable postponement 
was the precipitous drop in exports from Tanganyika, with the 1912 level of 
trade not being matched again until 1924 (Iliffe, 1979: 263). Shortly 
afterwards, the depression set in, export prices collapsed, and there were no 
significant development projects initiated in Tanganyika for over ten years 
(Iliffe, 1979: 345). The 1930s brought with them designs to encourage 
settler plantation agriculture, particularly in sisal. By comparison with 
other colonies the overall effort was trivial and hindered almost immediately 
by the onset of World War II. However, economic dislocation and 
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the war were just one set of factors which put a curb on development in 
Tanganyika. 
The future of capitalism in Tanganyika was also affected adversely by 
Tanganyika's belated entry into the British orbit. By the time of the 
transfer from Germany, Britain's empire was already large and the metropole 
was forced to be more selective about financial ventures in the colonies 
(Iliffe, 1979: 261). Consequently, Britain was unwilling to invest heavily 
in Tanganyika, which had the related effect of making it difficult to attract 
the type or amount of capital which could have helped to promote full-fledged 
capitalist development. The policies adopted by the colonial state in 
Tanganyika reflected these economic constraints. Although the colonial state 
encouraged and actively insisted upon increased peasant commodity production 
for export, it effectively discouraged capitalist relations of production or 
the conditions which would prompt such relations. As an adjunct to its 
impoverished material base, the state also developed a paternalistic ideology 
of indirect rule. This ideology worked to justify a policy which discouraged 
industrialization, freehold tenure in land, proletarianization, and the 
creation of a middle class: in short, the patterns normally associated with 
classic capitalist development. In discussing the reasons for the adoption of 
such a policy, Brett notes, 
[There were] difficulties involved in creating an even 
marginally successful settler sector in Kenya in compe-
tition with the potential for peasant production inside 
the territory and with other export oriented settler 
economies in the rest of the world [These difficulties] 
suggested that given the conditions of the time, peasant 
development [in Tanganyika] was far easier and if the word 
can be used, more "natural" than the creation of a settler 
colony. The latter required massive administrative and 
economic injections on behalf of an economic structure 
which found it very difficult to compete effectively on 
world markets. The African peasantry, on the other hand, 
requiring very little in the way of capital and being 
prepared to work long hours for small returns, provided a 
valid base on which to establish and maintain the modest 
administrative and commercial superstructure which British 
colonialism imposed. Once the fundamental decisions had 
been taken to prefer this sytem, the policy tended to 
operate in a relatively untroubled environment--the 
intense conflicts which characterized the whole process of 
change in Kenya were eliminated and the administration was 
brought under very little direct pressure from groups 
inside or outside the territory (Brett, 1973: 217-218). 
However, even before this policy had really solidified, capitalist 
development was already hamstrung by Tanganyika's status as an international 
mandate. The terms of the mandate, which were designed to protect the local 
population by prohibiting the separation of land and labor, also worked to 
discourage capital accumulation and the emergence of a proletariat (Buell, 
1928: 429-430). At one level, the document could in fact be read as an 
anticapitalist manifesto. Beyond this, the mandate also inhibited private 
investment because of the ambiguity it created regarding Britain's 
relationship with Tanganyika. On this point, Buell argues, 
As in the Camerouns, many traders, having heard only 
vaguely of the general principles of the mandate system, 
believed that the British Government could administer the 
territory only for a term of years, and that it could be 
taken away from the government by the League of Nations. 
Consequently, a general uneasiness arose which, according 
to officials and business men, hindered investment of 
capital in the territory (Buell, 1929: 432). 
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Apart from the Mandate document itself, there was a real and seemingly endless 
uncertainty surrounding Tanganyika's future, an uncertainty which was dramat-
ically accentuated by the depression and World War II. As early as the 
interwar years Britain felt insecure concerning her hold over Tanganyika. 
German imperialists continued to clamor for Tanganyika's return and with the 
onset of the war, it became a real possibility and an additional deterrent to 
business investment (Iliffe, 1979: 302; Brett, 1973: 116, 231). A further 
indication of Britain's somewhat ambiguous status in the territory was that 
the lion's share of Tanganyika's trade continued to be directed to Europe 
rather than to Great Britain during this period (Iliffe, 1979: 301, 304). 
The immediate effect of the mandate was to place Tanganyika "at the bottom of 
the imperial pecking order" (Iliffe, 1979: 302). It had a much lower 
priority than Kenya and was never particularly significant from either an 
African or a global perspective (Brett, 1973). Its longer-term impact was the 
"continuing poverty" which later became "British Tanganyika's leading 
characteristic" (Iliffe, 1979: 261). 
Tanganyika's belated status as a British protectorate, the terms of the 
mandate itself, and the uncertainty regarding her future, all discouraged 
_European settlement. Ironically, it was the absence of a strong settler 
population in Tanganyika which adversely affected capitalist development 
there. In conjunction with other tendencies, this absence effectively opened 
the way for the "liberal" policies of the colonial state which were hostile to 
primitive accumulation, capital accumulation, and industrialization, policies 
which were in fact antagonistic to capitalist development. 
By the end of World War II, when Britain's grasp over Tanganyika was firm, 
settler colonies were viewed as expensive, troublesome propositions. 
Furthermore, Kenya already had a primus inter pares status within the East 
African imperial framework. The most important result was that European 
settlement never became official colonial policy in Tanganyika (Reeves, 1976: 
16), with the official policy ranging haphazardly from active discouragement 
to mild encouragement. Hostility to the idea of turning Tanganyika into a 
settler colony actually predated British entry and was introduced under German 
rule. The attitude of the first German governor, Rechenberg, was that "the 
supply of raw materials to Germany [was] the object ••. and whether it [was] 
achieved through plantation agriculture or native cultivation [was] a 
secondary consideration." Rechenberg prohibited anything beyond an initial 
alienation of land by German settlers and refused to keep Africans from 
planting coffee (in competition with Europeans) in spite of the latters' 
protests that they didn't "need black capitalists," but "black workers" 
(Iliffe, 1979: 144, 154-155). 
With some variations, the basic thrust of this anti-settler policy con-
tinued under British colonialism. From the standpoint of capitalist develop-
ment, the weakness of the settler population was important. It permitted the 
British colonial state to adopt policies which not only slowed settler 
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immigration, but were also hostile to land alienation and hence to capital 
accumulation. In 1920, in conjunction with the terms of the mandate, the 
colonial government declared Tanganyika to be "primarily a black man's 
country" and a law was soon introduced to protect African customary tenure 
(Iliffe, 1979: 262). The immediate effect of the law was to discourage 
primitive accumulation either by Europeans or by Africans. Although the 
adoption of the law coincided with the terms of the international mandate, it 
was in fact predated by other realities which made it inevitable. Initially, 
the British colonial state was simply not in an administrative position to 
encourage European settlement. Later, "the depression ended [any] prospects 
of a viable expatriate sector on the land," while the possibility that the 
territory might be transferred to Germany inhibited growth after 1936" (Brett, 
1973: 231). Between 1917 and 1924, German settlers were deported, their land 
was bought up by indigenous Asians and Europeans, and no more land alienation 
occurred until much later. Along with the German exodus, insufficient labor 
discouraged further European settlement and by 1921, there were only 2,447 
settlers in comparison with 4,998 in 1913. The numbers picked up gradually, 
reaching 8,200 by 1931 , growing again from 9,345 to 10,648 between 1938 and 
1948, and increasing to 20,598 by 1958 (Iliffe, 1979: 303-304, 373, 450). 
Finally, by 1961, there were 22,000 Europeans in Tanganyika (British 
Information Services, 1961: 2), but as of 1957, 89 percent of them were not 
landed settlers, but employees of foreign firms (Clark, 1978: 38; Iliffe, 
1979: 450). 
Aside from the problem of sheer numbers, Britain's settler policy also 
suffered from constant ambiguity; when the colonial state was theoretically 
encouraging settlers, often it appeared to be doing the reverse. In 
Tanganyika, unlike Kenya, Britain didn't encourage new immigrants with aid or 
technical assistance, but was still anxious to increase its presence to 
counteract German influence (Iliffe, 1979: 373). Nevertheless, many parts of 
Tanganyika were declared "unsuitable" for European settlement and those with 
potential sometimes had inadequate support services (Clark, 1978: 66). A 
further source of ambiguity was the overtly hostile attitude of Tanganyika's 
first British governors towards European settlers. While at one level this 
appeared to be a fortuitous congruence with decisions reflecting objective 
material conditions in the metropole, at another level it was nonetheless a 
partial contradiction. Begrudgingly conceding the need for some settlers in 
the late 1920s, Governor Cameron was adamant in insisting that at least they 
should be "men of means otherwise they would need government subisidies" 
(Brett, 1973: 226). Cameron's views became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 
half-hearted attempt to settle ex-servicemen of lesser means after World War 
II failed. It proved too arduous for them and they were forced to return to 
Britain (Raikes, forthcoming: 4.11). The general lack of support for 
European settlement was also reflected in the colonial state's unwillingness 
to prohibit Africans from growing crops which were also produced by 
Europeans. The issue finally came to a head in the 1920s. Frustrated by the 
competition from Chagga coffee growers and the difficulties of obtaining 
labor, Europeans in the Kilimanjaro region sought unsuccessfully to have the 
area transferred to Kenya (Iliffe, 1979: 276). Still later, they launched 
another unsuccessful movement, this time for a "closer union with Uganda and 
Kenya" (Iliffe, 1979: 321). These failures were in turn indicative of the 
weakness of Tanganyika's settlers, a weakness which had adverse consequences 
for capitalist development in the colony. 
From the standpoint of capitalist development, the absence of a strong 
settler population in Tanganyika created a vicious circle which fed on earlier 
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tendencies to deter both an influx of private capital and a heavy outlay of 
British state capital for development. The weakness of Tanganyika's settlers 
also negatively affected the development of industrial capital, the lynchpin 
of classic capitalist development. One of the many factors which discouraged 
industrialization in Tanganyika was the failure of its European population to 
act as a "well established pressure group" (Rweyemamu, 1973: 116), a fact 
which contrasted starkly with the Kenyan situation. Kenya's settlers were 
above all "economic nationalists" (Brett, 1973: 77). They engineered 
successfully--and sometimes against the colonial state--for land, labor and 
perhaps most importantly, industrialization. As Brett notes, 
The difference [between Kenya and Tanzania] can be attrib-
uted directly to the presence there of the settler commun-
ity, with its strong political position and its commitment 
to a limited form of economic nationalism, as well as to 
the destabilizing effects of the settler economy upon the 
local society. The settlers, although initially an 
exclusively agricultural community, accepted the need to 
industrialize partly in order to provide more secure 
markets for local agricultural products, partly out of a 
desire to see a viable modern economic system established 
on the lines of the others underway in the white 
Dominions. Equally important, their presence had the 
effect of breaking down the self-sufficiency of the 
African economic systems based on indirect rule. In the 
Kenyan case this had become evident by the mid-thirties 
.•. taking the form of apparent rural impoverishment 
through overcrowding and worklessness. In such circum-
stances the administration was able to jettison any hopes 
of saving "traditional man" from the demoralizing effects 
of factory labour much more rapidly than was the case in 
peasant economies (Brett, 1973: 276). 
In Tanganyika, the combined effect of the entire colonial settler policy 
worked against settler nationalism and hence did not invite a settler indus-
trial strategy of the Kenyan sort. In contrast to Kenya, Tanganyika's 
European settlers were relatively few, of mixed nationalities, far from the 
administrative hub of Dar es Salaam, and generally isolated from each other 
(Brett, 1973: 222). British settlers barely dominated the colony numerically 
and had only the slimmest lead over German settlers. This created problems 
for Great Britain and for settler capitalism, as Britain was theoretically 
prohibited from favoring her own nationals under the terms of the inter-
national mandate. The effect of the diversity and isolation among Tanganyika 
settlers as well as their lack of state support meant that unlike their Kenya 
counterparts, they did not organize politically until very late in the 
colonial period and they were never able to act as a "cohesive force" or as a 
"well established pressure group" (Rweyemamu, 1973: 116). Furthermore, 
Tanganyikan settlers produced only 21 percent of the revenues from farming in 
contrast to the 78 percent produced by Kenya settlers (Clark, 1978: 38) and 
they commanded a much smaller portion of the best land. 
The overall result was that neither primitive accumulation nor industrial-
ization of the Kenyan variety occurred in Tanganyika. What this indicated was 
that Tanganyika was going to be a colony on the cheap. It was designed to 
extract revenues through the expansion of household commodity production 
rather than through any radical transformation in either the social relations 
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of production or the development of the productive forces. The plantation 
sector continued to be small throughout the colonial period. The size and 
influence of the settler population as well as the inducements offered by 
Great Britain were not significant enough to interest a large flow of either 
settler or international capital. Industrial development was also almost 
nonexistent, in part because of the proximity and greater attractiveness of 
Kenya. Tanganyika then was a classic example of what Kay meant when he said 
"capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the underdeveloped 
world, but because it did not exploit it enough" (Kay , 1975: x, 96-156). 
From the standpoint of industrialization, the adverse effects of Britain's 
overall Tanganyikan policy were apparent early on. By the late 1930s, Kenya 
already had an established industrial base. It was stimulated by "the short-
ages of manufactures during World War II" (Reeves, 1976: 23) and effectively 
protected by the East African Common Market, which Tanganyika had joined in 
the mid-1920s. The common customs and transport policies operated as 
protectionist devices, which turned Tanganyika into a dumping ground for 
Kenyan goods. Most of Tanganyika's trade went through Kenya's ports (Clark, 
1978: 33) and by the 1930s she had an unfavorable balance of trade within 
the common market that continued after independence (Brett, 1973: 104-105; 
Rweyemamu, 1973: 116-119). Pending any long-term clarification concerning 
Tanganyika's colonial status, industry went to Kenya. Subsequently, 
"centripetal pressures converg[ed] on Kenya" (Rweyemamu, 1973: 116) and 
"Tanganyika scarcely felt the post-war industrialization taking place in Kenya 
and Uganda" (Iliffe, 1979: 471). Few industries invested in Tanganyika 
before 1940, with the pattern continuing still later (Iliffe, 1974: 447). 
Those which did, concentrated in the urban areas, employing a miniscule 
portion of the population, whose needs were easily serviced by imports from 
Kenya (Brett, 1973: 276). Consequently, a sophisticated, proletarianized 
work force did not develop and as a reflection of this impoverished manufac-
turing base, the state emphasized clerical over industrial training (Reeves, 
1976: 23). By 1961, manufacturing represented only 3 percent of Tanganyika's 
GDP in contrast to Kenya's 10 percent. Even the passage of the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act, which provided imperial funds for long-term 
stable growth in preparation for eventual independence, did not alter the 
basic structure of Tanganyika's economy. Infrastructure and public works were 
emphasized in contast to productive enterprises. The results were unimpres-
sive and 11[i]n Dar es Salaam, the .•. [new Development] Act scarcely ruffled the 
leaves in Acacia Avenue" (Iliffe, 1979: 438). 
The confluence of material conditions in Great Britain and Tanganyika 
which eventually matured to a policy of antiindustrialization was buttressed 
by the colonial administration's paternalistic, anticapitalist ideological 
pronouncements. Ideologically, these pronouncements were in many respects the 
historical antecedents of "dependencia" theorizing and Nyerere's brand of 
Narodnik "socialism." From the perspective of the times, they were part of a 
superstructure which justified the development of a primary producing enclave 
economy based on the expansion rather than the displacement of household 
commodity production, the extraction of absolute as opposed to relative 
surplus value, and the attenuation of class formation. Both of Tanganyika's 
first two governors, Cameron and Byatt, made numerous statements concerning 
the evil effects of capitalism on the African population. Cameron believed 
that "It is our duty ... to do everything in our power to develop the native 
along lines which will not Westernize him and turn him into a bad imitation of 
a European" (Iliffe, 1979: 321). On the other hand, the colonial adminis-
tration was also disgusted by the "extravagance" of Haya chiefs whose largesse 
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was based on precapitalist feudal relations and proceeded in 1925 to "free the 
tenants from slave labour" (Iliffe, 1979: 238). The same administration made 
its feelings quite clear; it felt that "capitalism amongst natives .•• is to be 
deprecated" (Iliffe, 1979: 473) and recommended an African curriculum in the 
schools (perhaps·the forerunner of Nyerere's "education for self-reliance"). 
Above all, its pronouncements suggested that it was in favor of preserving the 
"natural African" and that it viewed urban industrial development as "alien 
and dangerous" (Iliffe, 1979: 326). Nevertheless, at both the ideological 
and material level, it was a policy wracked by contradictions. Notwithstanding 
official ideology concerning the encouragement of household commodity 
production, Tanganyika's first British governor, Cameron, made political 
rather than economic matters his foremost concern. The 192Os were spent 
developing a completely new administrative apparatus from scratch, institu-
tionalizing "indirect rule," and creating an entire "native authority system" 
(Brett, 1973: 49). Consequently, the colonial state paid little attention to 
the development of cash cropping by Africans during this period, with 
increases in agricultural production largely explained by higher producer 
prices (Iliffe, 1979: 19). Once economic matters did become a concern, the 
contradictions of colonial ideology and its strategy for capitalist develop-
ment were also apparent. As Iliffe has noted, "peasants were encouraged to 
grow coffee, but coffee farmers [especially big ones were perceived as] 
•swollen headed' and subversive" (Iliffe, 1979: 326). 
In spite of the growth of European sisal plantations in the 193Os, the 
policy of expanding smallholder agriculture among Africans continued, with the 
economic base of the colony in the peasant sector rather than in small scale 
European settlement along Kenyan lines (Brett, 1973: 232). Throughout the 
colonial period, it was a policy which could not escape the contradiction of 
promoting change while clamping down on transformation. It is these contra-
dictions and their results which help to explain the class character of the 
postcolonial state and why a Narodnik type of populism became the Tanzanian 
way. The contradictions themselves stem from changing policies on land, 
labor, and the creation of a capitalist middle class. On the one hand, 
Europeans in Tanganyika alienated less than one percent of the land, few 
restrictions were placed on what Africans were allowed to grow, and the 
official policy was to promote cash cropping by peasant producers. Further-
more, proletarianization was minimal by comparison with Kenya, where the 
imposition of settler agriculture often necessitated separating the producer 
from his means of production, resulting in landlessness. At level of 
appearances and reality, the policies seemed and often were more "liberal" 
than those across the border. On the other hand, these same policies were 
fraught with disaster. Until very late, they were inherently designed to 
expand commodity production without inducing capitalist relations of 
production, without developing the productive forces, and hence without 
altering the value of labor power. 
In the first instance, colonial land policy stunted the development of 
rural capitalism. For most of the colonial period, the state insisted on 
"native customary tenure" (Iliffe, 1971: 38), refused to allow freehold title 
deeds, and in 1946 adopted a policy of "retaining ultimate control of all 
land" (Iliffe, 1979: 451). The implications were well appreciated by rich 
Chagga farmers, who tried unsuccessfully to convince the colonial government 
that the buying and selling of land and title deeds was "traditional" (Iliffe, 
1979: 275). Although the agglomeration of land continued, so did 
fragmentation on the basis of traditional rights. The concentration of land 
was sometimes based on precapitalist relations which were often exploited by 
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chiefs (Rweyemamu, 1973: 27; Reeves, 1976: 26; Pratt, 1976: 21; Iliffe, 1979: 
460-461). When it was based on commodity relations, it was sometimes 
disguised as "precapitalist" to avoid interference by the state. Furthermore, 
in an area like Ismani, the lack of legal rights to land meant that capitalist 
farmers were sometimes more interested in quick profits than in farming 
practices which would maintain the fertility of the soil (Awiti in Cliffe et 
al., 1975: 68, 54). In other areas, farmers "feared that rehabilitation might 
lead to the loss of land to Europeans" (Iliffe, 1971: 36). The overall result 
of attempting to cement "tradition" amidst change was to stymie the develop-
ment of a class of rural capitalists by keeping it small, insecure, and under-
capitalized, thereby retarding accumulation. This in turn chatteled the 
formation and organization of rural wage labor. 
The policy of promoting smallholder production while discouraging prim-
itive acumulation by either Europeans or Africans (Iliffe, 1979: 451) was full 
of other contradictions. These contradictions eventually destroyed "tradi-
tional" agriculture without transforming it. It was official policy to expand 
cash-crop production by household producers, but Africans received little in 
the way of scientific advice and the policy was half-hearted at best. The 
colonial state was allegedly dedicated to smallholders. Nevertheless, when 
Europeans complained about competition from African coffee growers in 
Kilimanjaro area, the state adopted an ambiguous policy of "non-encouragement 
without prohibition" (Iliffe, 1979: 287). Agricultural credit was also not 
available for Africans until very late in the colonial period (Raikes, 
forthcoming: 1.20-1.23). The official reason given for the policy of denial 
was the circular argument that Africans did not have title to their land and 
could not offer security. With the exception of occasional advice by missions 
and improved seeds offered by Europeans, little was done systematically to 
develop African agriculture (Brett, 1973: 229; Coulson, 1977; Raikes, forth-
coming: 4.1-9.1). This neglect was itself a partial contradiction at the 
ideological level. It also combined with extensive production of the land and 
the depression to produce material contradictions of landlessness, overpop-
ulation, erosion, famine and falling producer prices that bore witness to the 
crisis in African agriculture between 1929 and 1945 (Iliffe, 1979: 346-380). 
The colonial state's initial response was a policy which relied heavily on 
coercion by Native Authorities to enforce minimum acreage requirements, as 
well as compulsory regulation concerning destocking and terracing. It was 
also designed to increase revenues from Tanganyika to help alleviate Britain's 
depressed economy and outstanding war debts (Iliffe, 1979: 436). The results 
of compulsion were often disastrous, but African cash-crop production never-
theless began to flourish in the late 1940s and 1950s, again primarily in 
response to increased producer prices (Raikes, forthcoming: 4.7-4.10). 
Finally, the colonial state's failures in developing smallholder produc-
tion, plus political exigencies in the 1950s, led to the ultimate contra-
diction of dismantling the policy itself. Faced with "Mau Mau" across the 
border, Britain wanted to insure a stable middle class in the transition to 
independence. She decided on a policy of "colour blind capitalism" to 
support "progressive farmers" "by encouraging the replacement of customary 
land tenure by individual freehold" (Iliffe, 1971: 553, 37) and by selectively 
supplying Africans with credit. However, it was a policy that could at best 
be described as too little too late and the legacies of the independent state 
remained with the earlier period. In Kenya, nationalists spent years fighting 
for the right to title deeds, whereas in Tanganyika they argued against it and 
immediately challenged this change in colonial land policy. The challenge 
itself is not well understood. It may have reflected the dominant class 
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interests of the nationalist movement itself and its petit-bourgeois base. 
The change may also have been viewed as a means by which Europeans and Asians 
would attempt to consolidate their interests or as the beginning of a master-
plan proposal for "multi-racialism" (Pratt, 1976: 28-31, 38-42). Whatever the 
reasons, Nyerere used the opposition to the new colonial land policy to 
consolidate political support for the the Tanganyika African National Union 
(TANU) in 1958, claiming, 
If we allowed land to be sold like a robe, within a short 
period there would only be a few Africans possessing land 
in Tanganyika ••.• We would be faced with a problem which 
has created antagonism among people and led to bloodshed 
in many countries of the world (Nyerere in Iliffe, 1971: 
38) 
The nationalist movement was not simply challenging colonial policy. At a 
deeper level, it was opposing the mainstays of capitalism: primitive accumu-
lation, which Marx viewed as the essential starting piont of capitalist 
development, and capital accumulation which Marx regarded as necessary to its 
survival and transformation. 
In a number of other respects, the colonial government's new "focal point" 
aproach, which aimed to create a "progressive" class could not so quickly 
dismantle old patterns. Specifically, it could not escape the contradictions 
of the previous forty years which had neglected industrialization and set in 
motion its own form of regional specialization and rural differentiation, 
stunting the development of both a rural proletariat and a rural bourgeoisie. 
The contradictions which had been set in motion were numerous. 
In the first instance, the middle class, the historical bulwark of 
capitalist development, was small and poorly trained in Tanganyika. Given the 
low level of investment by international capital and the consequent lack of 
industrialization, there had been little need for a large number of educated 
Africans prior to the 1950s. As Brett has noted, "colonial policy in 
Tanganyika tended to discourage forms of economic change which might lead the 
African population off the land into secondary and tertiary economic 
activities" (Brett, 1973: 276). The opposite was true in Kenya. And 
furthermore, with all the restrictions facing that nascent bourgeoisie, there 
were simply more opportunities to interject into the pores of capitalist 
society. Although Tanganyika experienced some minor industrialization in the 
1940s with the setting up of the brewery, coke industry and flour mills 
(Iliffe, 1979: 473, Clark, 1978.), the structure of the economy was not 
tranformed (Clark, 1978: 32). The capital, Oar es Salaam, remained small, 
with only 129,000 of a total population of 9 million by 1957 (British 
Information Services, 1961: 2). Only four percent of the total population was 
in the cities ( Pratt, 1976: 21) and, of the thirty-two percent who were wage 
earners (Pratt:1976: 21), the majority were employed in agriculture or public 
service, with less than half as many individuals in the private 
non-agricultural sector as in neighboring Kenya (Clark, 1978: 36-37). 
Consequently, in spite of Britain's belated change in policy concerning the 
creation of a "progressive" capitalist class, both the educated middle class 
and the urban working class continued to be extremely small and their 
experience limited. In 1961, there were only 150 university graduates and 176 
secondary students (Reeves, 1976: 27). The upper reaches of the civil service 
reflected the same tendencies, with one African in a senior post in 1951, 155 
in 1957, and only 346 by 1960 (British Information Services, 1961: 34). 
y 
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The small size of the formal wage earning class (Pratt, 1976: 21) was the 
other half of this too-late policy, which was attempting to institutionalize a 
"progressive" middle class. Its smallness was the offspring of a colonialism 
which had insisted on cash-crop production, but actively fettered full-fledged 
proletarianization (Mapolu, 1972: 1-37; Rweyemamu, 1973: 27; Raikes, 
forthcoming: 3.10-3.11). Its smallness symptomized the continued aggregration 
of production for consumption and exchange at the level of the household. In 
agreeing to grant freehold tenure in the mid-1950s, the colonial state finally 
acknowledged that "widespread landlessness" "would have to be accepted" 
(iliffe, 1971: 38). However, the lack of a strong settler and industrial base 
in Tanganyika continued to exert its influence. It meant that fewer wage 
laborers were needed and by and large they could be obtained through migration 
or in conjunction with household production, solutions that did not 
necessitate separating producers from their means of subsistence. 
The effect of colonial development policy was that certain parts of the 
country became migrant labor reserves while maintaining the peasantry's tie to 
the land, thereby aborting the emergence of a rural proletariat. From the 
standpoint of labor, the result was that migration was not "a pattern of 
life," but rather "an incident in a man's life" (Iliffe, 1971: 17). 
Nevertheless, it was a disruptive pattern which contributed to the 
backwardness of certain areas by continously withdrawing labor at peak periods 
and by retarding the development of commodity relations in general. The 
overall impact of these differing patterns was at best mixed in that, 
no African society in Tanganyika was proletarianized by 
the plantation economy during the colonial period .... No 
Tanganyikan society lost its economic independence in the 
sense that the Kikuyu did in Kenya or the Sotho in 
Southern Africa (Iliffe, 1971: 18). 
The other half of the picture was that capitalism could only be 
institutionalized in its most backward form as the emergence of a proletariat 
was fettered. In addition to the colonial state's land policy, the regional 
character of its development policy also contributed to this fettering. In 
Tanganyika, productive agricultural land was mostly on the rim of the country 
looking outward toward Kenya and Uganda. It was these areas which had 
attracted settlers and were comparatively well served by transport and 
marketing facilities, unlike the drier interior. It was here in places like 
Ismani, Mbulu, Kilimanjaro, and Lushoto where Africans bagan to produce cash 
crops alongside European estates (Iliffe, 1979: 274-305). When no suitable 
cash crop could be found or when poor infrastructural development made 
marketing too costly, other areas including Kigoma, Songea and Mtwara turned 
into migrant labor reserves. They grew to service both expatriate and 
indigenous producers in the richer less arid parts of the country (Wayne, in 
Cliffe et al., 1975: 131-144; Wayne, 1979. Some of these reserve regions were 
eventually able to commercialize their agriculture when other factors such as 
favorable prices and the post-World War II "cash crop boom" made it profitable 
(Iliffe, 1979: 454; Iliffe, 1971: 17). Nevertheless, migrant labor remained 
the dominant pattern even following the introduction of the "focal point" 
approach of the 1950s. In fact, the approach itself was not designed to 
disrupt this pattern. Migrant labor continued to be wed to small holder 
agriculture thereby perpetuating a mass of unskilled labor with low 
productivity (Rweyemamu, 1973: 23) and precluding any transformation in the 
value of labor power. The result was that a "vicious circle was built up with 
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poverty compelling migration and migration in turn hindering the alleviation 
of poverty" (Iliffe, 1971: 17; Rweyemamu, 1973: 23). From the standpoint of 
rural labor, the effect of its tie to the land coupled with migration was that 
capitalism was retarded and rural poverty became endemic. As Lenin had noted 
some years earlier discussing a similar situation elsewhere, 
But where is the superiority of the tie with the 
land, if the market already so dominates the whole of 
the country's •.. life that it discounts this tie by 
lowering the earnings of the agriculturist (Lenin, 
II: 400). 
There is no need to say more about the enormous 
significance •.• of the "power of the soil". . • . We need 
only recall what a tremendous factor low earnings are 
in retarding the use of machinery and lowering the 
workers standard of living (Lenin, II: 393). 
The 1950s policy of supporting "progressive" farmers was also unable to 
surmount completely the past. It came too late to dismantle completely the 
earlier policies of the colonial state which had in fact discouraged the 
development of a rural bourgeoisie. Pre-capitalist relations and 
organizations of production were sometimes perpetuated rather than dismantled, 
thereby also hindering the development of rural capitalism. 
In the areas on the periphery, there existed a definite class of 
capitalist farmers from the earliest times (Awiti and Lawrence in Cliffe, et 
al., 1975; Mbilinyi, 1974; Shivji, 1976). By independence, they were already 
beginning to reinvest their accumulated capital in transport, small 
businesses, and real estate. Although the price boom of the 1950s plus the 
colonial state's attention to "progressive" farmers further expanded their 
capital and opportunities, these capitalists generally pre-dated the change in 
policy. The Chagga had established a land market as early as the 1920s. They 
had formed their own marketing organizaton and continued to buy and sell land 
in spite of the colonial state's opposition (Iliffe, 1979: 274). In other 
areas, including the Usambaras, landlessness was not uncommon (Von Freyhold, 
1979; Iliffe, 1979: 469-473). Furthermore, although they did not have access 
to rural credit initially, many farmers nevertheless managed to accumulate 
capital which they quickly plowed back into farming. It came from their work 
in urban trade, as lorry drivers, cattle buyers, shopkeepers, government 
clerks, and mechanics (Iliffe, 1979: 453; Reeves, 1976: 17). In some 
places, the results were large holdings, mechanization, and huge tractor hire 
schemes (Awiti and Raikes in Cliffe et al., 1975: Iliffe, 1979: 453; 
Feldman, 1975: 158-170). From this perspective, capitalist development 
seemed to be moving along quite unabated. 
But capitalism did not always develop "along classical lines" (Iliffe, 
1979: 463). Sometimes land and labor were obtained, kept and recruited on 
the basis of pre-capitalist relations (Iliffe, 1979: 458-68; Reeves, 1976: 
26; Boesen, 1977: 93). Food crops were grown before cash crops; a very small 
percentage of what was produced was sold (Iliffe, 1979: 459); there was 
little change in the techniques of production with the exception of the few 
"tractor farmers;" the circulation of commodities was poor, and "few farmers 
were earning incomes which would match those of the tiny urban middle class" 
(Pratt, 1976: 22). The "focal point" approach of the 1950s did not dismantle 
the dominant feature of the earlier colonial agrarian policy, smallholder 
production on less than two hectares of land (Raikes, forthcoming: 2.7) 
continued to dot the landscape. One result was that primitive accumulation 
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and the emergence of a capitalist class were retarded. From a somewhat longer 
term perspective, the results were more ominous. As scientific agriculture 
began to mature, the so-called "subsistence economy" was under more and more 
strain and gradually it began to break down (Boesen, 1977: 50-56). The 
majority of the rural population increasingly consisted of a pressurzied 
middle peasantry and rural allotment holders, with exact numbers and lines 
very unclear (Feldman, 1975; Cliffe et al., 153-179). Class differentiation 
appeared to have gone furthest in the areas most heavily penetrated by 
commodity relations, along the fertile rim of the country, and least far in 
the most backward parts of the territory. It was precisely such seemingly 
contradictory qualities to which Lenin referred when he noted that "capitalism 
penetrates into agriculture particularly slowly and in extremely varied forms" 
(Lenin, 1974: 181) and that it exists "both where ... development is low and 
where it is high" (Lenin, I: 438). It was also these same qualities which 
affected later developments. 
Tanzania's Ruling Class: The Independence Movement and the Class Content of 
the Post-Colonial State 
Tanzania's most dramatic later development was an announcement in 1967 
that it would pursue a "socialist" path following the now famous Arusha 
Declaration. Initially, this meant nationalizing the commanding heights of 
the economy, promoting communal production in rural "ujamaa" villages, and 
adopting a policy of "education for self-reliance," which integrated 
agricultural work into the primary school curriculum. It also included a 
"leadership code" which prohibited senior state officials from holding more 
than one job, from having shares in or directing private companies, from 
owning rental property, and from employing wage labor. The effect of these 
policies was to inhibit the development of a bourgeoisie and to stunt 
capitalist development in Tanzania without producing a socialist 
alternative.7 The reasons these populist policies were proposed and pursued 
are not well understood. Clearly they relate in part to the antecedents 
discussed above as well as to the historical exigencies of the time. Both in 
turn affected the class content of the independence movement and the class 
content of the post-colonial state. It is this class content which must be 
understood if one is to ascertain why Tanzania's ruling class virtually 
cemented backward capitalist development after independence and why it 
prohibited classic forms of capital accumulation without dismantling 
capitalism itself. 
The historical weakness of Tanganyika's nascent bourgeoisie adversely 
influenced the course of capitalist development later. However impressive 
they were in terms of qualitative or regional influence, Tanganyika's rural 
capitalists were "no more than a few hundred" (Raikes, forthcoming: 1.23), 
were scattered far from the capital, and did not act as a cohesive political 
force to control the independence movement. Here they mirrored the impotence 
of European settlers, with similar consequences from the standpoint of their 
long terms interests. Significantly enough, Tanganyia's kulaks did not unite 
to oppose Nyerere's and TANU's attack on the colonial state's proposal for 
freehold land tenure. This was in stark contrast to their Kenyan counterparts 
who clearly appreciated the relationship and importance of private property to 
capitalist development. The nascent Kikuyu bourgeoisie in Kenya occupied the 
central spine of the country which cut through the capital of Nairobi. There, 
settler agriculture had led to widespread landlessness and to prohibitions on 
Africans planting certain cash crops. In reponse, Kenya's future big 
bourgeoisie was well-organized politically as early as the 1920s. 
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By the 1930s it reflected its own class interests at the Kenya Land Commission 
hearings, where it berated the colonial state for being "communist" (Njonjo, 
1977) and for not differentiating between them and the rest by allowing the 
"better farmers" to plant coffee and have individual title to the land. This 
class dominated the independence movement from its inception, partaking of 
populist and nationalist elements throughout, but never controlled by them. 
Kenya's big bourgeoisie essentially came to power to strip capital of its 
racial fetters and proceeded to smash its petit bourgeois opponents who saw 
the situation somewhat differently. Ultimately, it was aided by the colonial 
state itself, which could be said to have done much of the dirty work for the 
Kenyan bourgeoisie, beginning with primitive accumulation. 
The class content of the independence movement in Tanganyika is less 
clear. It appears that in Tanganyika, rural capitalists apparently did not 
face the same urgency to control the independence movements as their Kenyan 
counterparts. The colonial state did not alienate their land, did not 
prohibit them from growing lucrative cash crops, and they did not face a 
strongly organized group of settlers with the political clout to turn 
Tanganyika into a Rhodesia. A class analysis of the nationalist movement in 
Tanganyika has yet to be written. From what can be gathered, kulaks sometimes 
dominated TANU locally, but apparently did not control it nationally (Raikes, 
forthcoming, 1979: 1.25; Iliffe, 1979: 516). Why this happened is still 
unclear. Although important, this alone did not set the stage for the 
adoption of a Narodnik path by Tanzania's ruling class following the Arusha 
Declaration. Furthermore, from the evidence available, one cannot simply 
deduce the Narodnik-like character of the post-colonial state in Tanzania from 
the class content of the independence movement. In many respects, the 
movement itself was not terribly dissimilar to those in other states which 
later took a more strongly capitalist orientation. Like them it had a 
nationalist/populist base and it consisted of a variety of forces most 
accurately described as strange bedfellows. It garnered a great deal of 
support by attacking chiefs who had participated in enforced agricultural 
change, by organizing around local issues, and by opposing colonial proposals 
for multi-racialism. The nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU) was built up by clerks, teachers, farmers, traders, and 
occasionally by civil servants who joined illegally (Bienen, 1969; Hyden, 
1968; f.laguire, 1969). The party had a "weak central structure" (Rweyemamu, 
1973: 31) and was strongest in the towns outside of Dar es Salaam (Pratt, 
1976: 22-23). The party was dominated by "local issues and was strengthened 
by the incorporation of a number of district cooperative unions designed to 
circumvent expatriate control of marketing which tended to be Asian outside 
the capital." 
It appears that if one is to explain why Tanzania's ruling class sought to 
institutionalize populism after 1967, one must look beyond the class content 
of the independence movement itself to contemporary events and to other 
factors which helped to solidfy what amounted to petit bourgeois control of 
the state. These other factors included Tanganyika's inability to attract 
foreign capital in the first six years after independence (dependencia 
theorizing notwithstanding) and a variety of internal difficulties. 
Tanganyka's immediate strategy after independence was not novel. It was 
geared to offering attractive concessions to foreign investment, retaining 
expatriates in the civil service, deferring rapid.Africanization, and 
continuing to support "progressive" farmers. However, the strategy proved 
unworkable and Tanganyika soon began to experience financial difficulties. 
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International capital continued to flow into Kenya, with Tanganyika perceived 
as too underdeveloped to compete in attractiveness. Furthermore, neither 
Kenya nor multinational capital found it in their interest to uphold the 
Kampala Agreement of 1964 which had planned for a specialization of industries 
among the countries of the East African Community and was designed to divert 
capital to Tanganyika to remedy past imbalances. In addition, between 1964 
and 1965, the situation was exacerbated by a further flight of international 
capital to the tune of Sh. 290 million (Rweyemamu, 1973: 43). This flight 
followed a number of foreign policy pronouncements in which Tanzania 
recognized East Germany, broke off relations with Great Britain for not 
intervening against Rhodesia's UOI, began to offer support for Southern 
African liberation movements, and formed a United Republic of Tanzania, 
following Zanzibar's revolution. At the same time, the price of sisal, 
Tanzania's major export, fell precipitously and she felt the economic pinch. 
However, the adoption of a populist path by Tanzania's ruling class was 
also a reponse to internal factors. Tanganyika was already experiencing 
political instability and other difficulties even before it became clear she 
would have trouble attracting international capital. In 1964, Britain was 
called in to put down an army mutiny which arose over the continued retention 
of expatriates, the slow pace of Africanization, and poor pay. The demands 
echoed those of Tanzania trade unionists who wanted a speedier takeover of top 
jobs by Africans, better pay, and proceeded to implement a series of strikes, 
which led to the loss of 417,000 man days in 1963 alone (Rweyemamu, 1973: 47; 
Coulson, 1979: l; Pratt, 1976: 110). Resentment was also building against 
Nyerere's attempts to retain expatriate civil servants from the colonial 
period and his proposed concessions to these Europeans on pension plans, 
retirement schemes, salaries, and multi-racial citizenship. TANU responded by 
taking up these issues. The issues which TANU was forced to deal with were 
economic insolvency and political instability. 
Nyerere's declaration of "socialism" in 1967, with its nationalizations 
and restrictions on certain types of private accumulation was at one level a 
direct response to Tanganyika's inability to attract foreign capital for 
development and to her internal political difficulties. At another level, the 
rhetoric of national "self-reliance" and agrarian populism was also the 
indigenous class's attempt to make an ideological virtue out of what they 
found to be politically necessary and economically expedient to insure their 
own survival. It was still further an attempt to mobilize the disenfranchised 
popular classes behind the state and eventually to force all other classes 
into dependence on it. It was above all a "preemptive move" (Raikes, 
forthcoming: 2.7). In certain respects the Arusha Declaration succeeded in 
dealing with the immediate problems facing the state, at least in an interim 
fashion. By stressing "African tradition," the anti-capitalist, anti-Western 
thrust of much of the Arusha Declaration effectively gave the state a licence 
to impress the peasantry into agricultural production and to extract surplus 
value without transforming the basis of production itself. In this respect, 
it was similar to the policies of the early colonial state which had preceded 
it. By stressing "socialism" without class struggle, the Arusha Declaration 
ironically enough also paved the way for a re-entry of external capital, 
thereby temporarily heading off further financial problems. 
The way in which Tanganyika's ruling class chose to deal with the economic 
and political crises which faced it by 1967 were not predetermined, but a 
reflections of its material base. TANU was preeminantly a party of the petit 
bourgeoisie. In Kenya, petit bourgeois elements were pushed out of key 
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positions in the state immediately after independence, but in Tanzania, in the 
absence of a strong bourgeoisie, they succeeded in dominating the upper 
echelons of both the party and the state. Petit bourgeois control was further 
consolidated by the fact that before independence, Nyerere had resisted 
turning TANU into a mass party (Iliffe, 1979: 516; Pratt, 1976: 34) and it 
had no history of armed struggle. Shortly after independence, almost all of 
TANU's "abler administrators" went to other jobs and except for the National 
Executive Council, the party consisted of numerous experienced but uneducated 
political activitists (Pratt, 1976: 210-211). In addition, the 
administration did not provide a counterpoise to the party. Unlike Kenya, 
where the political party was effectively dismantled in favor of the 
administration after independence, the reverse held in Tanzania, perhaps 
because the civil service was still an expatriate stronghold (Pratt, 1976: 
95, 105). Although workers supported TANU in the early years (Iliffe, 1979: 
539), the ruling class began to dismantle the trade union movement by 1964 and 
the party increasingly consolidated its support around the lower echelons of 
the petit bourgeoisie. As early as 1960, the TANU Executive Council vote to 
turn back the colonial state's land reform measures of the 1950s and to 
abolish freehold tensure (Iliffe, 1979: 575) while party publications often 
did not surmount "racialist radicalism" (Leys in Cliffe and Saul, 1972: 187; 
also Raikes, forthcoming: 1.13). 
It was to this petit bourgeois constituency that the Tanzanian ruling 
class turned when it was unable to attract the capital to follow its original 
strategy and internal instabilities threatened its own longevity. In 1962, 
Nyerere temporarily resigned to upgrade the party with Kawawa becoming Prime 
Minister. Kawawa used the period to increase TANU's power, to consolidate the 
support of the petit bourgeoisie, and to politically dismantle the popular 
classes. The government opened up the civil service to Africans and in the 
rural areas it promoted the expansion of producer marketing cooporatives, 
which increased from 857 in 1961 to 1518 in 1965, with their membership 
expanding by over 100,000 between December 1962 and 1963. Simultaneously, it 
made TANU part of the government, turned Tanzania into a one party state, and 
introduced a Preventive Detention Law (Pratt, 1976: 187-191; 123). The 
independence of the umbrella trade union organization, the Tanganyika 
Federation of Labour (TFL), was also undermined: The government renamed it 
the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), made it an affiliate of TANU, 
appointed the minister of labor as its general secretary, and proceeded to 
"effectively ban ••. strikes" (Jackson, 1979: 227). The policies on land and 
cooperatives in the early post-independence period were not socialist but 
nationalist measures; in one case they were measures which eliminated 
"non-indigenous" claims to landed property, in the other, Asian traders 
(Rweyemamu, 1973: 48). 
Although these policies had petit bourgeois appeal, it is important to 
stress that they also cut across class lines. To the nascent bourgeoisie, the 
policies adopted by the ruling class in the immediate post-independence period 
could not then have been perceived as threatening, either to those in the 
rural areas or to those in the upper echelons of the civil service. The 
policies were geared to repressing the popular classes and controlling 
political participation, hardly anti-bourgeois inclinations. Other policies 
had the immediate virtue of eliminating competition from expatriates, opening 
up new business opportunities, and curtailing political and economic demands. 
Furthermore, with respect to the reversion of the late colonial policy on 
individual title deeds to land and its potential threat to capital 
accumulation by an indigenous bourgeois class, Rweyemamu suggests that there 
was no immediate effect. As he argues, 
there was moreover no other policy on land, its 
distribution or land tenure. People were merely urged to 
expand their acreage of crops without consideration being 
given on the eventual effect of these expansions on land 
tenure and class formation. 
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Initially then, TANU's early anti-capitalist land policy -- which was no more 
than a throwback to that of the early colonial period -- did not keep rural 
capitalists from accumulating any more than it had in the past. Eventually, 
following the Arusha Declaration and the periods of "ujamaa" and 
villagization, it heightened the dependence of this class on the state, 
increased its insecurity (Raikes, forthcoming: 2.28, 3.9), and at times kept 
it from operating openly as big capital. In the interim, it potentially 
enhanced the political and economic leverage of the larger, more dominant, and 
more vocal petit bourgeoisie over its big bourgeois competitors, an effect 
appreciated by the latter perhaps only in retrospect. The absence of title 
deeds sometimes "subordinate[d)" rich peasants to "state officials" (Raikes, 
forthcoming: lD.21). It also assured the state of its potential legal clout 
11to control land use" by all classes, a fact of great significance, given the 
historical importance of agriculture in surplus accumulation and the want of 
industrial alternatives. Finally, of course, the absence of freehold land 
titles stymied the development of agrarian capitalism and cemented its 
backwardness. As Raikes notes, 
In the absence of registered (or any other secure) 
property rights, [rich peasants have had] to engage in 
political manoeuvering not simply for gain but in order to 
keep a reasonably secure hold on what they had got 
(Raikes, forthcoming: 3.9. Also, 2.8-2.9). 
The policies adopted by the Tanzanian ruling class prior to 1967, were not 
socialist. What the land policy indicated, however, was the predominance of 
petit bourgeois control over the state and a certain hostility to big 
capital. The various sections of the Arusha Declaration demonstrated these 
same tendencies. The question of why they were proposed by the ruling class 
and accepted by a nascent bourgeoisie is nevertheless puzzling given the 
manner in which parts of the declaration restricted the opportunities for 
private accumulation. 
From a certain perspective, the absence of overt hostility to the Arusha 
Declaration by a nascent bourgeoisie is easily comprehensible. The popularity 
of the nationalizations, for instance, is not difficult to understand. They 
opened up a whole range of positions to Tanzanians which had formerly been 
occupied by expatriates and brought what had been a private job market under 
the wing of the state. It was a move widely applauded by the lower echelons 
of TANU, few of whom had "professional or technical skills" and for whom "a 
loss of political office would have meant an eventual return to peasant 
farming 11 (Pratt, 1976: 185). Nationalization was also the material 
confirmation of Nyerere's dependencia theorizing that Tanzania's only 
alternative to national self-reliance was becoming a "very junior partner" to 
foreign capital, with "independent capitalist development impossible" (Nyerere 
in Coulson, 1979: 4, 21). From the standpoint of capital accumulation, the 
nationalizations may also not have appeared problematic. Given the general 
backwardness of the economy, the state may have seemed for many the most 
attractive and secure source of accumulation available. The prohibitions on 
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private accumulation only affected "leaders" and not the majority of civil 
servants and party members. Once one descended from the "commanding heights" 
of nationalization, over half the economy was still privately run. 
Consequently, this part of the Arusha Declaration had a great deal of 
support. Indeed, it may well have seemed to be the best of two worlds; it 
opened up opportunities in the state, without foreclosing the possibility of 
private accumulation. 
Less well understood, is the question of why Tanzania's ruling class 
adopted a "leadership code" which effectively fettered its own ability to 
accumulate (Pratt, 1976: 237). Apparently, the ruling class was not 
generally receptive to those directives in the Arusha Declaration, which 
prohibited top leaders in TANU and the Government from simultaneously working 
for the state and engaging in private enterprise. But finally "they were 
accepted" (Pratt, 1976: 237), although little is known about how they were 
initiated or approved. At one level, the ruling class itself appeared to be 
committing economic suicide, by foreclosing its opportunities for 
entrepreneurship. At another level, it was also engaging in a strategic act 
of political legitimation which did not ultimately have negative implications 
for the class as a whole. From the perspective of the times, however, it 
seems clear there were different factions within the ruling class who had 
different conceptions of the optimal strategy to be pursued at this particular 
point in history. Some looked enviously across the border at their Kenyan 
counterparts who were already having a capitalist field day. Others, like 
Nyerere, had alreay mobilized their support from the lower echelons of the 
TANU petit bourgeoisie, built up in the troubled mid-196Os. These lower 
echelons were not directly affected by the directives of the "leadership 
code." If anything, they appeared to feed into their interests as they had 
the effect of forestalling a competitive class of big capitalists. 
Furthermore, those parts of the ruling class that were antagonized by the code 
were quickly accommodated. As Pratt has noted, 
Leaders were allowed to transfer the ownership of property 
to a trust which they could set up in the name of their 
children. This meant that investments in property whose 
purpose was to provide for the future needs of a leader's 
children were again permissible. The second compromise 
limited the ban on the employment of labour to workers who 
were employed on a permanent and full-time basis. This 
permitted many leaders in the rural areas who were also 
substantial farmers to continue to employ casual labour in 
periods of peak-labour need (Pratt, 1976: 239). 
In addition, the directives had certain interim advantages. Politically, the 
directives helped the ruling class to maintain the illusion of classlessness 
in Tanzania with the suggestion that the rulers themselves were not 
exploiters, but "men of the people" (Achebe, 1966). Economically, they did 
not clamp down on exploitation per se, simply on capitalist forms of 
exploitation. Hence, the parts of the "leadership code" which prohibited the 
hiring in of wage labor but permitted casual labor, were in certain respects 
in keeping with the backwardness of this ruling class as a capitalist class. 
Furthermore, these same directives had the added virtue of elevating 
exploitation on the basis of "pre-capitalist" social relations to the lofty 
heights of "socialism." In short, the state could be said to be assisting its 
ruling class to accumulate prior to the political and economic maturity of the 
class itself. From the standpoint of those who were genuinely antagonistic to 
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the directives of the leadership code, the option of open political 
opposition was not really there. As Raikes has noted, 
colonialist and racialist views were sufficiently 
prevalent that the talk of a domestic exploitating class 
or criticism of the operations of the state could rather 
easily be mistaken as personalized criticism of the new 
African members of the civil service (Raikes, 
forthcoming: 1.13). 
Furthermore, given the populist character of the "leadership code" and the 
already repressive political atmosphere, it would have been "very difficult to 
oppose [the directives] publically" and "for most of [the ruling class], the 
eventual gains "exceeded the losses they would suffer ...• " (Coulson, 1979: 
3). An indirect indicator of the gains was recurrent government expenditure 
which preceded to rise by twenty percent per annum (Coulson, 1979: 12) in the 
1960s and a "salariat," which began to "develop into an upper class" (Boesen, 
1977: 96). 
The all-out attacks on "exploiters" and "capitalists," which were part of 
the Arusha Declaration and became more vociferous later, were neither 
"socialist" nor mere mystification. They were the result of real material 
contradictions between the need for revenues to support a burgeoning state 
bureaucracy and the same policies of the state which had opened up the 
opportunities for petit-bourgeois accumulation in the 1960s. As Musti notes, 
quoting Cournanel, 
'the whole [bureaucratic] bourgeoisie constantly 
reproduces a tendency to appropriate privately the means 
of production.' Thus individualized modes of realization 
of surplus value are in action at the expense of common 
class interests. As a consequence "the State Bourgeoisie 
spontaneously tends to transform itself into [a] 'private' 
bourgeoisie and to reinforce the latter which on the other 
hand is always present on the side of the first." 
(Cournanel in Musti de Gennaro, 1979: 8-9). 
Hence, the seeming contradiction that the very policies which were adopted and 
needed by the Tanzanian ruling class at a general level to support its own 
reproduction and to avert political and economic crises were subverted in 
private as this class also appeared at times to be a class of accumulators in 
the process of transformation. At a concrete level, this contradiction was 
manifested by the fiscal crisis in the cooperative movement in the 1960s and 
later by the symbiotic relationship between rural kulaks, state officials and 
poor peasants during the period of "ujamaa" and villagization. In discussing 
the ruling class's attitude to the Arusha Declaration's proposal for communal 
production under "ujamaa," Von Freyhold notes, "Collectively they were in 
favour of the expansion of the economic power of the state, individually they 
hoped to become private and usually agricultural capitalists after their early 
retirement" (Von Freyhold, 1979: 120). Consequently, from the perspective 
of a burgeoning state in need of resources, rural kulaks needed to be 
attacked, while from another perspective they were in fact the future allies 
of the state's bureaucrats themselves. The result was that 
Those who manned the state and the Party were in favour of 
nationalizing all those ventures that were beyond their 
reach, but certainly against a communalization that would 
have left them without private opportunities. 
From the standpoint of the dominant groups in the Party 
and the state the plea of the President for democratic 
communalization thus appeared to be something like an 
aberration. They did not contradict him openly, first 
because they needed him to appease workers and peasants 
and secondly because they expected that in practice the 
whole campaign would look quite different as indeed it 
did. Eventually the bureaucracy managed to turn the 
slogan of Ujamaa into a tool which could be used for its 
own purposes. Workers could be told that their wage 
claims were illegitimate because the nation needed the 
funds for the socialist reconstruction of the countryside 
and that compared to the peasants they were selfish 
individualists. The unemployed could be collected and 
sent back to the villages to build Ujamaa. Kulaks and 
peasants who stood up to oppose certain bureaucratic 
measures and orders could be told that they obstructed 
Ujamaa and in the end even the subordination of the 
peasantry under a new authoritarian bureaucracy that 
reached down to the village level could be legitimized in 
the name of Ujamaa (Von Freyhold, 1979: 120). 
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The victims of the contradictions produced by the policy of "ujamaa" as 
well as the other parts of the Arusha Declaration were increasingly the 
popular classes. It was they who were herded into "ujamaa" villages and 
expected to produce surpluses for the state. The popular classes suffered 
more and more from a repressive state which needed greater and greater 
surpluses to survive its unending expansion (Pratt, 1978: 218; Coulson, 
1979: 12; Raikes, forthcoming: 2.4) and to transform its ruling class. 
However, neither the expanding state alone nor the apparent and intermittent 
looting of state coffers by individual bureaucrats produced the contradictions 
which created periodic financial crises at the general level of the state. It 
was instead the coupling of these tendencies with a Narodnik organization of 
production, which precluded increases in the productivity of labor and 
extraction other than on the basis of absolute surplus value. Capitalism was 
thereby stunted in its most backward form and turned into a zero sum game. In 
addition to sanctifying exploitation on the basis of pre-capitalist relations 
and insuring the perpetuation of a landed petit bourgeoisie, the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967 did nothing to transform the social relations of 
production or the productive forces. The extraction of surplus value depended 
on expanding a middle peasantry engaged in cash crop production. Production 
and consumption remained integrated at the level of the household, with no 
transformation possible in either the productive forces or in the value of 
labor power. There was a limit to how much surplus value could be produced or 
extracted short of transformation, and the state responded by becoming 
increasingly represssive. "Strikes .•. virtually ..• disappeared" (Jackson, 
1979: 219) and political participation was increasingly circumscribed. This 
petit bourgeois capital which parasitically fed off peasants and workers also 
clung like a dying vulture. It reinforced what appeared as "pre-capitalist" 
relations (Raikes, forthcoming: 2.28; Boesen, 1977: 93, 160; Von Freyhold, 
1979: 39); relations which were in fact necessary for middle and poor 
peasants to survive and for rich peasants to accumulate. Their appearance was 
in fact the only available means by which individuals could respond to a state 
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that had cut off the possibility of full-fledged capitalist relations of 
production by implanting and resurrecting a Narodnik form of populism which 
had its roots in the policies of the early colonial state. These appearances 
reinforced the petit bourgeois interpretation that it was a recalcitrant and 
traditional peasantry which was acting to subvert the state and its allegedly 
"socialist" policies. In fact, it was the state's own petit bourgeois 
policies of capitalist development which had cemented backwardness. 
Conclusion 
When the colonial state in Tanganyika was unable to attract development 
funds or industrial capital, it responded by expanding middle peasant 
household production, using force to counteract the contradictions created by 
its own policies, and ultimately dismantling the policies themselves. The 
post-colonial state took up some of the same options for related reasons. 
However, the contradictions were sometimes even starker. The period after the 
1950s was a period of monopoly capitalism in which scientific agriculture 
became more important and the necessary quality and quantity controls were 
bound to exert greater and greater pressures on an untransformed middle 
peasantry. Also, a new force had arisen: an unproductive ruling class whose 
only response to declining agricultural surpluses was a more extensive and 
forceful entry into the sphere of production to insure its own reproduction as 
a class. The contradictions of its failures were exhibited by declining 
agricultural production (Coulson, 1977: 13) and an increasingly represssive 
state (Olle and Schoeller, 1977). 
Tanzania's "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" lacked the material base to act like 
its Kenya counterpart and was not prepared to support land policies that would 
develop capital out of its control and proletarianize a middle peasantry. 
Hence, while Kenya devised policies to support the further development of a 
big bourgeoisie, its poorer sister "chose" Narodism to institutionalize a 
petit bourgeoisie and small capitalism. 
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NOTES 
1 The word absolute is underlined here because the conflict between capital 
and labor obviously continues to exist and clearly produces misery. The 
difference between the Kenya and Tanzania cases is the difference between a 
capitalism which matured to extract on the basis of relative surplus value and 
one which continues to extract by means of absolute surplus value, although in 
parts of Kenya the latter continues to prevail, as it also does within various 
sectors in advanced capitalist systems. For theoretical discussions of the 
point see Marx's discussion of the difference between absolute and relative 
surplus value and formal and real subordination in Mandel, Marx, Capital I, 
1977, as well as Kay, 1975; Brenner, 1977; Banaji, 1977; and for criticisms of 
Kay, Bernstein, 1976. For both a theoretical discussion of this point and an 
empirical case study from tobacco production in Tanzania, see Mueller, 1980. 
2 The Narodniks were nineteenth-century utopian theorists who believed 
socialism in Russian could be based on the traditional "mir." Lenin, 1974, 
attacked them for a defensive form of nationalism that aimed to serve the 
interests of the small producer as opposed to either big capital or organized 
labor. He argued, however, that any attempt to implement Narodism would 
actually lead to the pauperization of the small producer, since it would 
attempt the impossible task of institutionalizing capitalism in its least 
developed and most backward form. He insisted further that the 
commoditization of the economy made it impossible to return to the 
"traditional" past so heralded by the Narodniks because it no longer existed. 
He also argued that any attempt to resurrect this past was not progressive, 
but reactionary, since it could only be an attempt to resurrect features of 
pre-capitalist society which were opposed to the interests of labor in 
general. For a discussion of how Lenin's critique applies to the Tanzanian 
experiment since 1967 see Mueller, 1979, 
3 The term "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" was originally coined by Shivji, 
1976: 66-99 and Shivji in Cliffe and Saul, 1973: 304-330. There have been a 
variety of criticisms of the term itself as well as the content Shivji 
ascribed to the term. There is no attempt in this essay to reiterate or 
reanalyze previous discussions, except by implication as it neither views the 
class as a "puppet" of international capital nor as "progressive." Readers 
interested in following the discussion to date should turn to the following: 
Reeves, 1976: 28-50; Shivji, 1976: 66-99; Von Freyhold, 1979: 20 and other 
scattered discussions; collected essays by Saul, 1979: 167-297; Raikes, 
forthcoming: 1.15-1.19 and chapter 10; Von Freyhold, 1977; Saul 1974; 
Nabudere, 1976; Nsari, 1975; Tabari, 1975; Rodney, 1975; Leys, 1976: 46-48; 
Pratt, 1976; Mwansasu and Pratt, 1979: essays by editors, 3-18, 169-236, by 
Barker, 95-124, and by Boesen, 125-144. The list is hardly exhaustive as a 
great deal of discussion on this point took place at the University of Dar es 
Salaam. Some was published in the journal Maji Ma.ii and references can be 
found in Reeves, 1976, whereas a great deal more material is ephemeral. Part 
of the reason this class is so poorly understood is that academics took 
Tanzania's "socialism" seriously for some time and there was a reluctance to 
denationalize the nationalist movement and to look at this class as a class, a 
tendency which persists. In addition, it is far more difficult to analyze 
classes in a situation in which the state denies their import. The main 
points which need to be researched at present are a) the historical and 
material roots of this class and its role and relationship to the nationalist 
movement, b) the historical relationship of this class to rural capitalists, 
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and c) whether and how this class is using its salaries and perks to transform 
itself into a class of private capitalists. 
4 The Arusha Declaration refers to a set of policies which a) nationalized 
the commanding heights of the economy, b) set forth a policy of individual 
"self reliance" and national "self reliance" vis-a-vis international capital, 
c) proposed an agrarian program based on communal production in "ujamaa" 
villages, and d) was followed by a leadership code which prohibited civil 
servants from holding more than one job, engaging in business, having more 
than one house or renting property. 
5 A whole series of regulations under the mandate in theory made development 
along the Kenyan lines unlikely as there were restrictions on land alienation 
and infringing the rights of the local inhabitants. See Buell, 1928. However 
as Iliffe, 1979: 247 notes, "Generally the mandate was an old-fashioned 
document embodying pre-war safeguards against colonial abuses but containing 
no provision for enforcement against a recalcitrant mandatory." 
6 The question of to what degree these policies stemmed from Tanzania's 
status as an international mandate and to what degree these policies stemmed 
from factors peculiar to British capitalism after World War I awaits further 
research. 
7 For a lengthy discussion of this point as well as of why the alternatives 
proposed were not socialist to begin with see Mueller, 1979, and Mueller, 1980. 
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